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Note
Extraterritorial Enforcement and Prosecutorial
Discretion in the FCPA: A Call For International
Prosecutorial Factors
Emily Willborn*
Corruption is a worldwide problem without a
comprehensive international solution.1 In 1977, the United
States passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act2 (FCPA or Act)
to enforce anti-bribery laws against U.S. corporations,
protecting its own reputation and foreign policy interests.3 The
FCPA prohibits companies that are listed on the U.S. indexes
and regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) from bribing foreign officials4 and contains provisions
that require specific accountings to ensure companies cannot
hide bribes in their financial records.5 The Act specifically
authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction, which means that as a
matter of law, it grants the United States far-reaching
international enforcement power.6
Unchecked extraterritorial enforcement has become more
*
J.D. candidate, 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2008,
Grinnell College. This Note would not have been possible without the support
of Professor Richard Painter or the assistance of the editors and staff of the
Minnesota Journal of International Law. Special thanks go to Steven Willborn
for his helpful comments on earlier drafts and constant inspiration.
1. Although there have been many treaties regarding corruption and
bribery, they lack the enforcement teeth necessary to address the problems.
See Sonja Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
1257, 1292–93 (2007).
2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -3,
78ff (2006)), amended by 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (1988) and 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff(1998).
3. See discussion infra Part I.A.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006); see Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 749, 757–65 (2011).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)-(b) (2006); see McSorley, supra note 4, at 752–57.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(i), dd-1(a), dd-3(a) (2006); see McSorley, supra
note 4, at 759.
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aggressive since 2007. 7 Each year, more foreign corporations
are accused of bribery in foreign nations and named as
defendants in U.S. suits, a fact which raises questions of comity
and foreign policy.8 Common prosecutorial tools like nonprosecution and deferred-prosecution agreements serve as a
means to bypass judicial scrutiny.9 This lack of judicial or
legislative direction leads to unclear standards.10 International
cooperation has become increasingly important, highlighted in
cases such as Siemens, an action against a German company
for bribery in Argentina and other foreign countries, and
Halliburton, an action against a French subsidiary of a U.S.
company for bribery in Nigeria.11 However, international will to
enforce foreign bribery laws can lead to questions of conflict
with foreign law12 and diplomatic issues.13
Therefore,
extraterritorial application may overreach its bounds in cases
such as News Corp, where the U.K. has brought its own
charges and an FCPA action against the U.K. subsidiary of a
U.S. company for bribery in the U.K.14 This application of the
7. See discussion infra Part I.B.
8. See discussion infra Part I.B.
9. See discussion infra Part I.C.
10. See discussion infra Part I.C. Many commentators suggest legislative
amendments to clarify these provisions. See, e.g., ANDREW WEISSMANN &
ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, RESTORING
BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
(Oct., 2010); Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 609 (2012) [hereinafter
Compliance Defense]; Charles Weinograd, Clarifying Grease: Mitigating the
Threat of Overdeterrence by Defining the Scope of the Routine Governmental
Action Exception, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 509, 511–12 (2010) (suggesting a two-part
test to determine a routine governmental action).
11. FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions: United States v. Kellogg
Brown
&
Root
LLC,
DEP’T.
OF
JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kellogg-brown.html
(last
visited Oct. 31, 2012) (linking to documents related to Halliburton subsidiary
Kellogg Brown’s investigation and judgment); FCPA and Related Enforcement
Actions: United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, DEP’T. OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemensaktiengesellschaft.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (linking to documents
related to Siemens investigation and judgment); see discussion infra, Part II.B.
12. See infra, notes 61–68, and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 130–136, and accompanying text.
14. See NEWS CORP., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, 15 (2011), available at
http://www.newscorp.com/Report2011/2011AR.pdf (“As a result of these
allegations [of phone hacking and payments to police], the company is subject
to several ongoing investigations by U.K. and U.S. regulators and
governmental authorities.”); Joe Pompeo, U.S. Litigation Against Rupert
Murdoch’s News Corp May Not Be Imminent; But It’s Still All Bad News For
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FCPA leads to difficulties normally associated with
extraterritorial application of U.S. law such as comity, conflict
with foreign law, interference with foreign legal proceedings,
and diplomatic issues. However, recently developed guidelines
issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and SEC do not
comprehensively address international factors.15
This Note examines the FCPA’s extraterritorial
jurisdiction and suggests a framework for taking international
factors into account when prosecutors make enforcement
decisions. Part I describes the history and legislative intent of
the FCPA, recent trends in enforcement, prosecutorial
discretion and possible prosecutorial decision-making factors,
and current FCPA enforcement guidelines. Part II analyzes the
possible enforcement factors from a perspective of legislative
intent. This Note attempts to answer the question of what
international factors should be included in future prosecutorial
guidelines issued by the DOJ or SEC.
I. HISTORY, TRENDS, AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCPA
A. ORIGIN OF THE FCPA AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed in
the wake of Watergate, after SEC investigations uncovered
corrupt payments to foreign officials in countries such as Japan
and the Netherlands by over 400 American companies,
amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.16 The scandal
Him,
CAPITAL
N.Y.
(Feb.
15,
2012),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/media/2012/02/5267941/us-litigationagainst-rupert-murdochs-news-corp-may-not-be-imminent-it; Ed Pilkington &
Dominic Rushe, News Corp Exposed to Growing Legal Threat Following
Charges
for
Tabloid
Duo,
THE GUARDIAN
(Nov.
20,
2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/nov/20/news-corp-legal-threat-brookscoulson-charges.
15. The SEC and DOJ issued guidelines on FCPA enforcement on Nov. 14,
2012. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FCPA: A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012)
[hereinafter
FCPA
GUIDANCE],
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf; see discussion infra
Part II.C.
16. See S. Rep. No. 95-114 at 3–4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4098, 4101 (referring to SEC Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate
Practices); H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf
(stating that 400 corporations have admitted to $300 million in corrupt
payments); see also H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1998) (discussing the
political climate); Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
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threatened foreign relations as well as the reputations of
American businesses, as foreign entities attempted to distance
themselves from the disgrace and Americans reacted with
distrust.17 Congress intended the passage of the FCPA to
combat bribery and protect the reputation of American
businesses and foreign policy positions.18 President Carter’s
signing statement indicated that the United States had no
intention of enforcing the Act against corporations
headquartered abroad, despite the fact that the Act’s language
permitted this application.19
In 1988, Congress amended the FCPA.20 The amendment
clarified the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA21 and directed
the Executive Branch to encourage foreign trading partners to
enact legislation similar to the FCPA to level the playing
field.22 The amendment arose from pressure by corporations
worried about the FCPA’s costs to American corporations
Act, 73 OHIO L. REV. 929, 932–49 (2012) [hereinafter Story of the FCPA]
(examining the SEC report and congressional record leading up to the passage
of the FCPA).
17. Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is To Be Done
With the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 431, 433
(1987) (“The discovery of payments by Lockheed to the Prime Minister of
Japan, for example, forced his resignation and chilled relations between the
two countries. Reports that Lockheed had paid Prince Bernhardt of the
Netherlands $1 million compelled him to relinquish his official functions.”).
18. Senate Report 114 at 3–4 (indicating that the Senate was primarily
concerned with the “severe adverse effects” of the uncovered bribery on
relations with “[f]oreign governments friendly to the United States” and “[t]he
image of American democracy abroad.”); see Longobardi, supra note 17, at 434
(citing HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL
CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. NO. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
5 (1977)). But see Story of the FCPA, supra note 16, at 972–80 (describing
problems the legislation attempted to address regarding foreign business
conditions and extortion of American companies, competitive disadvantage of
American companies doing business abroad, and defining bribery in a
reasonably predictable way).
19. See Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill,
Statement on Signing S. 305 Into Law, II PUB. PAPERS 1884, 2157 (Dec. 20,
1977) (indicating that the effort against bribery could only be successful “if
other countries . . . take comparable action” and urging the United Nations to
negotiate a treaty on the same subject).
20. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff).
21. These clarifications are beyond the scope of this Note. By way of
example, Congress amended the well-known routine governmental action (or
“grease”) exception. See Weinograd, supra note 10, at 517–19.
22. See Proposed Legislative History, International Anti-Bribery Act of
1998, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/leghistory.pdf.
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competing in foreign markets.23 The amendment had findings
that there was “unnecessary concern among exporters about
the scope of the Act,” but that the accounting standards were
“unclear and excessive.”24 From 1988 to 1998, the United
States focused its anti-corruption effort on international
agreements25
instead
of
aggressive
extraterritorial
enforcement.26
In 1998, Congress amended the FCPA again, prompted by
the ratification of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD
Convention).27 This time Congress agreed that the FCPA was
negatively impacting American business success abroad, and
suggested ratification of this international OECD convention
on corruption as the solution to international bribery.28 The
amendment also extended jurisdiction extraterritorially in
compliance with the OECD convention,29 but Congress did not
suggest aggressive enforcement abroad.30 President Clinton’s
23. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS: LAY PERSON GUIDE 2, available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 24, 2013); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICE ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS: COMPTROLLER’S GENERAL REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS 6 (1981).
24. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576 (1988) (Conf. Rep.) available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1988/tradeact-100-418.pdf.
See also Weinograd, supra note 10, at 517–19 (explaining criticism that the
FCPA placed US corporations at a disadvantage compared to foreign firms
who were using bribes to secure contracts).
25. See infra notes 53–65, and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 35–37, and accompanying text.
27. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff); Org.
for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Officials in International Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, [hereinafter
OECD
Convention],
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/investment/briberyininternationalbusiness/antibriberyconvention/38028044.pdf.
28. See S. REP. No. 105-277, at 2–3 (1998) (explaining how the
amendment puts the FCPA in line with the OECD Convention in order to
implement the Convention and “level the playing field”); Proposed Legislative
History, International Anti-Bribery Act of 1998.
29. The OECD Convention called on all parties to assert territorial
jurisdiction broadly, in order to give the Convention international application.
OECD Convention, supra note 27, art. 4 (“Each party shall review whether its
current basis for jurisdiction is effective in the fight against the bribery of
foreign public officials and, if it is not, shall take remedial steps.”).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(i), dd-1(a), dd-3(a). This is consistent with the
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signing statement repeated this emphasis on equalizing
business advantages between the U.S. and foreign companies,
and focused on enforcement of the convention as the path to
success.31
There have been many calls in academic and business
circles for legislative changes to the FCPA.32 The legislature
has not passed further amendments on the FCPA since 1998,
though several amendments have been proposed and a hearing
about enforcement was held in 2010. 33 These critics prompted
the DOJ and SEC to issue new written guidance in November
of 2012, in an attempt to clarify prosecutorial treatment of the
FCPA.34

OECD Convention goals of asserting jurisdiction “when the offense is
committed in whole or in part in [a country’s] territory” or “to prosecute its
nationals for offences committed abroad.” OECD Convention, supra note 27,
art. 4.
31. Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998, II PUB. PAPERS 1793, 2011 (Nov. 10, 1998).
32. See, e.g., WEISSMANN & SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, supra note 10, at 2–8 (proposing a series of amendments to improve
the FCPA, including adding a compliance defense, adding a “willfulness”
requirement for corporate criminal liability, clarifying the definition of a
foreign official, limiting successor and limiting parent company liability). But
see Brady Dennis & Tom Hamburger, 5 proposed amendments to the Foreign
Corrupt
Practices
Act,
WASH.
POST,
April
25,
2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/5-proposed-amendmentsto-the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act/2012/04/25/gIQAXbuVhT_story.html
(explaining the five proposals by the US Chamber of Commerce and their
rebuttals by the Open Society Foundation). .
33. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Before Subcomm. On Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong.
(2010)
[hereinafter
2010
Hearing],
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66921/pdf/CHRG111shrg66921.pdf; Overseas Contractor Reform Act, H.R. 3588, 116th Cong.
(2011); Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 3531, 116th
Cong. (2011); GIBSON DUNN, 2011 YEAR END FCPA UPDATE, 21 (Jan. 3, 2012),
available
at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2011YearEndFCPAUpda
te.pdf.
34. See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Speech at the 26th
National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 8, 2011)
[hereinafter
Speech],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111108.html
(“[I]n 2012, in what I hope will be a useful and transparent aid, we expect to
release detailed guidance on the Act’s criminal and civil enforcement
provisions.”). The SEC and DOJ issued guidelines on FCPA enforcement on
Nov. 14, 2012. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15.
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B. FCPA ENFORCEMENT TRENDS
1. Prosecutors’ Increased Extraterritorial Focus
The DOJ and SEC have expanded their enforcement of the
FCPA in the last decade. In the first few years after the FCPA
was enacted in 1977, prosecutors brought almost no
enforcement actions.35 Between 1978 and 2004, the SEC tried
cases under the FCPA an average of less than once per year
and the DOJ tried an average of less than two cases per year.36
In 2004, the two agencies brought five cases total.37
In recent years, the number of FCPA actions and related
penalties has ballooned. In 2009, the DOJ brought twenty-six
actions and the SEC brought fourteen civil prosecutions.38 In
2010, combined corporate fines and penalties under the FCPA
were approximately $1.8 billion.39 Each agency now has
between seventy and eighty FCPA investigations open at any
one time.40 Although the total number of enforcement actions is
not high compared to likely corruption around the world, the
number of actions is trending upwards and settlement costs are
regularly in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. 41 The
largest single action was against Siemens in 2008, resulting in
$800 million in U.S. fines and $1.6 billion in fines worldwide. 42
35. William L. Larson, Note, Effective Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 561, 568 (1980).
36. Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal
Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45
GA. L. REV. 489, 522 n.171 (2010).
37. Id. at 522.
38. Id. at 522–23.
39. Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 100 (2011) [hereinafter Big, Bold,
and Bizarre].
40. See McSorley, supra note 4, at 779.
41. See FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions, DEP’T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2010); SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last updated
Aug. 20, 2012).
42. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Siemens AG and Three
Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and
Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008)
(“Siemens AG will pay a combined total of more than $1.6 billion . . . including
$800 million to U.S. authorities, making the combined U.S. penalties the
largest monetary sanction ever imposed in a FCPA case since the act was
passed by Congress in 1977.”). Some believe fines as large as this are not
enough to stop corporations from bribery. See 2010 Hearing, supra note 33, at
2 (“Siemens enjoyed revenue that year of $105 billion and income of
approximately $8 billion.”).
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The numbers show no sign of slowing actions against
companies, nor a reduction in fines, and DOJ officials have
repeated that the priority of FCPA enforcement remains high. 43
The recent appointment of Mary Jo White, a prominent former
federal prosecutor, to head the SEC may indicate that heavy
handed prosecution is a priority for that agency as well.44
The surge in enforcement has increased corporations’ costs
in two ways.45 First, enforcement imposes higher legal
settlement costs on corporations under FCPA investigation.46
Second, enforcement imposes costs on corporations through
necessary internal investigations.47 Corporations often selfreport the results from these internal investigations to the
enforcement agencies, which may use them to prosecute or to
pursue non-prosecution or deferred-prosecution agreements.48
Extraterritorial enforcement, by its nature, implicates foreign
policy issues; the very definition of an FCPA violation requires
that a foreign government official take a bribe, which suggests
foreign government involvement in the corruption.49 In
43. See Westbrook, supra note 36, at 523 n.178; Joe Palazzolo, From
Watergate to Today, How FCPA Became So Feared, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904447525045780247916761511
54.html (quoting Larry Urgenson, lawyer at Kirkland & Ellis, LLP) (“The
FCPA has gone from a carriage trade into what the [Justice Department] has
said at times is [its] No. 2 priority behind terrorism.”).
44. See Ben Protess and Benjamin Weiser, A Signal to Wall Street in
Obama’s
Pick
for
Regulators,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
24,
2012,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/mary-jo-white-to-be-named-new-s-e-cboss/.
45. See supra notes 23–28, and accompanying text; Tor Krever, Curbing
Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.C.J. INT’L
L. & COM. REG. 83, 90 (2007) (summarizing empirical studies showing that the
FCPA led to a loss of business or export opportunities). But see id. at 90–91
(summarizing empirical studies showing that the FCPA had no effect on US
exports or demand for US products abroad).
46. See discussion infra notes 75–80, and accompanying text.
47. See Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 39, at 106 (giving examples of
professional costs that companies undertake to respond to FCPA
investigations). For example, Pfizer overhauled its FCPA compliance systems
after reporting instances of bribery to the SEC in 2004. See Ashby Jones,
FCPA: Company Costs Mount for Fighting Corruption, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1,
2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904447525045780248939880487
64.html.
48. In a non-prosecution agreement, criminal charges are not filed against
a company. In a deferred prosecution agreement, criminal charges are filed
but are not actually prosecuted. See discussion infra Part I:C.
49. See Elizabeth Spahn, Discovering Secrets: Act of State Defenses to
Bribery Cases, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 163, 180 (2010).

WILLBORN Note 5.1.13

430

5/21/2013 12:01 AM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 22

addition, there is an increasing trend towards enforcing the
FCPA against foreign-based companies rather than domesticbased companies.50 Although domestic companies still make up
the majority of FCPA enforcement actions, the percentage of
actions against foreign companies is a larger percentage of the
total than ever before,51 and foreign companies receive higher
average fines.52
2. Increased Foreign Government and International
Cooperation to Combat Bribery
International efforts to combat corruption in a coordinated
way have increased dramatically in the last two decades.53 The
focus of the 1998 amendment to the FCPA was the
international impulse to combat bribery, primarily through the
OECD Convention.54 The Convention has been ratified by 38
member states, which have varying but generally increasing
commitments to the Convention’s enforcement.55 It includes
mutual assistance programs for bribery convictions, which
encourage cooperation and assistance between parties to the
Convention.56 In addition, countries such as Norway and the
50. See Big, Bold, and Bizzare, supra note 39, at 105 (“[A]pproximately
90% of 2010 FCPA fines and penalties were paid by foreign companies . . .
[t]he trend of foreign companies comprising a large percentage of FCPA
enforcement actions is likely to continue.”).
51. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1775, 1833 (2011) (“[T]he DOJ has targeted more foreign firms than ever
before . . . .”).
52. See id. at 1812 (“[F]or otherwise comparable firms, a foreign firm will
receive a fine that is on average 22 times larger (between 12 and 41 times
larger) than the fine of a domestic firm.”). But see id. at 1813 (giving four
reasons for higher fines for foreign firms apart from different treatment).
53. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 285 (2004) (“States can only govern effectively
by actively cooperating with other states . . . .”).
54. See discussion supra Part I:A. In addition to the OECD Convention,
there have been at least six new international treaties addressing corruption,
showing international momentum to combat the issue. Starr, supra note 1, at
1292–93 (assessing the impact of seven international treaties).
55. See
TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL,
OECD
ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION PROGRESS REPORT 2008 1, 7–8 (2008), available at
www.transparency.org/content/download/33627/516718; GIBSON DUNN, 2010
YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 1, 29 (Jan. 4, 2011) [hereinafter GIBSON DUNN
2010],
available
at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCPAUpda
te.pdf.
56. See OECD Convention, supra note 27, art. 9 (“Each Party shall, to the
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Netherlands have been motivated by the Convention and the
United States’ urging to change their own laws which, before,
had allowed bribes to be written off on tax reports as business
expenses.57 Mutual legal assistance requests between member
states have supported prosecutions of bribery around the
globe.58 These legal assistance requests have been used to
prosecute recent high-profile cases such as the Halliburton
enforcement action.59 This kind of international cooperation
was the only international factor emphasized in the new FCPA
Guidance.60
Since ratifying the OECD Convention, other countries have
also enacted robust domestic anti-bribery laws.61 For example,
the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act became effective in 2011.62 It
is slightly different from the FCPA, with the most notable
differences being that the U.K.’s Bribery Act defines both
bribing and being bribed as offenses,63 contains a strict liability
fullest extent possible . . . provide prompt and effective legal assistance to
another Party for the purpose of criminal investigations . . . within the scope of
this Convention.”).
57. See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S.
Government’s Campaign Against International Bribery, 22 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 407, 494–95 (1999) (citing OECD Council Recommendation on
the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, OECD Doc.
C(96)27/Final, 35 I.L.M. 1311 (Apr. 11, 1996)) (explaining the success of the
Convention in addressing the tax deductibility of bribes to foreign officials).
58. See GIBSON DUNN 2010, supra note 55, at 29–30; OECD, PHASE
THREE REPORT ON THE U.S. APPLICATION OF THE OECD CONVENTION, (Oct.
15, 2010).
59. See Steven Pearlstein, Cashing in on Corruption, WASH. POST, Apr.
25, 2008, at D1 (acknowledging “valuable help from foreign governments since
the signing of a global convention”); Barbra Crutchfield George & Kathleen A.
Lacey, Investigation of Halliburton Co./TSKJ’s Nigerian Business Practices:
Model for Analysis of the Current Anti-Corruption Environment on Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 503
(2006) (analyzing concurrent investigations into Halliburton’s alleged
misconduct).
60. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 7–8, 63 (overviewing international
anti-corruption efforts including the OECD Convention and the OECD
Working Group, which monitors the implementation of the OECD
Convention).
61. See Starr, supra note 1, at 1291 (finding that there are criminal
bribery statutes in virtually every country).
62. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.) [hereinafter U.K. Bribery Act],
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents. This Act
came after an enforcement scandal involving BAE, a British military
corporation and the Saudi government. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1840–
43.
63. U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 62, at c. 23 §§ 1–2; see Lawrence W.
Newman, The New OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, N.Y.L.J. , Mar.
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provision for failure to prevent bribery,64 and provides an
affirmative compliance defense.65 In addition, the UK’s
Ministry of Justice proposed using deferred-prosecution
agreements. However, the agreements would differ from U.S.
agreements–in the U.K. the judiciary would play a much larger
role in the agreements, as required by the proposed law. 66
American law could come into conflict with a foreign antibribery law by virtue of a technical difference such as a
compliance defense, even though the laws have the same policy
goals.67 Increased international cooperation and increased
foreign enforcement against the same kind of bribery and
corruption that the FCPA prohibits leads to questions about
how U.S. prosecutors should change enforcement in the light of
29, 1999, at 3 (criticizing the OECD and FCPA for extending penalties only to
suppliers of bribes, and not to foreign officials demanding them).
64. U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 62, at c. 23 §§ 7–9. There is no provision
in the FCPA punishing failure to prevent bribery.
65. Id. at § 7; see GIBSON DUNN 2010, supra note 55, at 30–33;
Compliance Defense, supra note 10, at 636–37. This compliance defense allows
corporations with robust compliance programs a defense against claims by the
government. Compliance Defense, supra note 10, at 636–37. Many other
countries have compliance defenses in their FCPA laws as well. Id. at 638–44
(surveying such laws in Australia, Chile, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland). The DOJ opposes an
official compliance defense in the United States, but does use compliance as a
mitigating factor in prosecution and sentencing. See Examining Enforcement
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 33, at 26 (“The Department
opposes the adoption of a formal compliance defense . . . the Department
already considers a company’s compliance efforts in making appropriate
prosecutorial decisions, and the United States Sentencing Guidelines also
appropriately credits a company’s compliance efforts in any sentencing
determination.”).
66. Kathleen Harris, Will U.K. DPA’s Make a Difference?, FCPA
PROFESSOR BLOG (Nov. 13, 2012), http://fcpaprofessor.com/will-uk-dpas-makea-difference? (addressing a new proposal for the U.K. to use deferredprosecution agreements but stating that the use of judicial control make
prosecutors less powerful than they are in the U.S.). For more on prosecutorial
power, see discussion infra, notes 74–78, and accompanying text.
67. See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Speech at the IBC
Legal’s World Bribery & Corruption Compliance Forum (Oct. 23, 2012)
[hereinafter
IBC
Speech],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-121023.html (“In
short, the world is moving in one direction only with respect to anti-corruption
efforts . . . I hope and believe that we will continue to make strides in this area
together.”); Richard L. Cassin, James Murdoch And The FCPA, FCPA BLOG
(July 11, 2011), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/7/11/james-murdoch-andthe-fcpa.html (“[I]f the U.K. has sturdy enough laws, why are news outlets in
London and the U.S. so busy speculating whether James Murdoch could face
an American criminal prosecution under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?”).
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foreign policy and comity.68
C. EFFECTS OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
1. Powerful Prosecutors and Unilateral Decision-Making
The SEC enforces against civil violations of the FCPA,
while the DOJ enforces against both civil and criminal
violations.69 In the early days of FCPA enforcement, the DOJ
ordered its U.S. Attorneys to continue with investigations only
with express approval from Washington, and the State
Department took into account some of the foreign policy
concerns that were indicated by legislative intent.70 Now,
although federal prosecutors do technically report to the
executive branch, and therefore the President, U.S. attorneys
are seldom subject to direct oversight.71 The push for more
FCPA enforcement began with Mark Mendelsohn, a young
prosecutor at the DOJ who realized that the mostly-unenforced
FCPA could be enforced aggressively by using its far-reaching,
sweeping provisions.72 However, his broad prosecutorial
68. See discussion infra Part III:B; Nicolas M. Mclean, Cross-National
Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, 121 YALE L. J. 1970, 1982–86 (2012)
(analyzing whether prosecutors take into account considerations such as
foreign policy, international cooperation, foreign direct investment, and
corruption indexes); Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-35, 2012) (Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-15, 2012) (analyzing
enforcement patterns related to foreign policy concerns), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116487; George & Lacey,
supra note 59, at 507–09 (describing concurrent investigations by the DOJ and
SEC as well as French and Nigerian officials).
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c) (2006); Longobardi, supra note 17, at 441.
70. See Larson, supra note 35, at 569; Kate Gillespie, Middle East
Response to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer
1987, at 9–11. Now, enforcement by the DOJ is reserved for the main DOJ
Criminal Fraud Section to ensure consistency. See U.S. Attorney’s Manual §
9-47.110 (2011) (“No investigation or prosecution of cases involving alleged
violations . . . shall be instituted without the express authorization of the
Criminal Division.”).
71. Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent
Counsel: Court Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363,
380–85 (2001) (discussing the role and responsibilities of US Attorneys and
the general day-to-day independence they have); Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, The US Attorneys Scandal and the Allocation of Prosecutorial
Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (2008) (discussing allocation of prosecutorial
power between the President, US attorneys, and individual assistant US
attorneys).
72. See Palazzolo, supra note 43 (“Mark Mendelsohn, a young federal
prosecutor from the Southern District of New York, was the division’s FCPA
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discretion has the potential to lead to prosecutorial abuse. 73
Prosecutors work without significant judicial checks and
balances in part because many cases settle using nonprosecution and deferred-prosecution agreements.74 Although
the DOJ uses these agreements in other contexts, they are used
most often to resolve FCPA investigations.75 These agreements
are a type of plea bargain that permits prosecutors to charge
the corporations with the crimes, fine them, and induce them to
cooperate with the government by taking specific steps to
improve compliance without a formal enforcement action.76 It
makes sense to use the agreements when corporations are
especially cooperative.77 Deferred prosecution agreements may
result in fines below sentencing guidelines, which encourages
corporations to elect this alternative when possible.78
Because of the lower fines imposed when corporations
cooperate, many of these investigations begin by a corporation’s

point man at the time.”); Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 39, at 127
(criticizing Mendelsohn for starting the FCPA enforcement frenzy as a
prosecutor, and then moving to a private defense firm).
73. See Courtney Thomas, The FCPA: A Decade of Rapid Expansion 29
REV. LITIG. 439, 462–66 (2010) (submitting arguments on both sides of the
debate on if the current enforcement system encourages prosecutorial abuse).
74. This contrasts with early FCPA prosecutions, when judicial checks
could be used to incorporate foreign policy concerns. See Margaret A. Niles,
Judicial Balancing of Foreign Policy Considerations: Comity and Errors Under
the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REV. 327, 359 (1983).
75. See GIBSON DUNN 2010, supra note 55; Mike Koehler, What Is An
FCPA Enforcement Action?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan.
7, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/what-is-an-fcpa-enforcement-action (examining
the different actions that may be taken as a result of an FCPA investigation
and attempting to define what constitutes a single enforcement action).
76. See IBC Speech, supra note 67.
77. Legislative intent does not support a compliance defense, but the DOJ
takes corporate compliance efforts and cooperation into account. See H.R.
REP. NO. 100-576, at 922–23 (1988) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1955 (showing the 1988 amendment originally had a safe harbor
for corporations with compliance procedures but that it was taken out); Arthur
F. Matthews, Defending the SEC and DOJ Foreign Corrupt Practices
Investigations, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 303, 340 (1998) (arguing compliance
is a mitigating factor in criminal prosecutions) (citing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2(k) (1995) (updated in 2011 at § 8C2.5)),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011_guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_8.pdf.
78. See Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 39, at 128 (finding that in 10 of
the 12 enforcement actions in 2010, the average fine was 25% below the
minimum guidelines range). This decreases the value of the guidelines as an
indicator of liability.
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voluntary self-reporting.79 Companies then conduct their own
internal investigations, with the help of outside counsel, and
provide the material to the DOJ themselves.80 These
investigations can cost millions of dollars, and often times
uncover actions that the enforcement agencies would not find
on their own, but for which companies may still be held liable. 81
The resulting agreements do not have the benefit of a judicial
check, so even when case law rejects the government’s
interpretations of a particular provision, prosecutors may
ignore the courts’ interpretations for the purpose of a
prosecutorial agreement.82 This creates a prosecutorial
“common law of settlement” that governs in lieu of judge-made
or legislative law.83
2. Prosecutorial Enforcement Guidelines Lack Sufficient
Assistance
The DOJ and SEC recently issued FCPA enforcement
guidelines, which were met with criticisms of issuing them too
late and a lack of clarity. 84 These criticisms are valid and, at
79. Ironically, this may explain a large portion of enforcement, since
detection of bribery would otherwise be very difficult. See Larson, supra note
35, at 565–70 (stating that “agency enforcement is unlikely ever to be
effective” because of the difficulty in detecting violations); Garrett, supra note
51, at 1833 (suggesting the increase in enforcement is partially due to
voluntary self-reporting).
80. See Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 1, 2012, (quoting Assistant Attorney General Breuer as saying “We
absolutely need companies through their firms to provide us with their
investigations . . . prosecutors test information they receive from companies
through parallel investigations.”); Mike Koehler, FCPA-Palooza, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-palooza
(questioning Breuer’s statements that during his time on the defense bar, he
“never once got the sense that the enforcement agencies tested the information
or conducted a parallel investigation”).
81. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1786 (reporting that Siemens’ costs of
investigating its FCPA case were over $500 million in legal fees and that the
investigation uncovered over $1 billion in bribe payments that had not been
found by regulators).
82. See Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 39, at 119–22 (citing United
States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004)) (giving an example of a case
interpreting the FCPA’s “obtain or retain business” element and later
prosecutions that seem to ignore that interpretation).
83. Michael Levy, Prosecutorial Common Law, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG
(March 16, 2011), http://fcpaprofessor.com/prosecutorial-common-law.
84. The 1988 amendment included a provision allowing the DOJ to issue
further guidance on enforcement, but the DOJ declined to do so. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-1(d)-78dd-2(e) (2006); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Anti-Bribery Provisions, 55
Fed. Reg. 28,694 (July 12, 1990); Mike Koehler, DOJ – Guidance Better Late

WILLBORN Note 5.1.13

436

5/21/2013 12:01 AM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 22

the very least, the guidelines do not offer new information for
best practices of the enforcement of the FCPA.85 Others
criticize the guidance as counter to judicially sanctioned FCPA
enforcement policy.86 Most legal propositions in the guidelines
are supported by DOJ or SEC settlements, rather than
legislative interpretation or case law.87 Along with offering
little information on domestic questions of prosecution, the
guidelines fail to offer additional information regarding foreign
prosecutions or international factors beyond superficial
references to international cooperation.88 Other statutes that
are enforced extraterritorially have meaningful guidelines
regarding extraterritorial enforcement.89
than Never, But Will it Matter?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-guidance-better-late-than-never-but-will-itmatter (“[T]he Attorney General has determined that no guidelines are
necessary . . . [Compliance] would not be enhanced nor would the business
community be assisted by further clarification of these provisions.”); See Mike
Koehler, Grading the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance,
BLOOMBERG/BNA WHITE COLLAR CRIME REPORT (Dec. 14, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189072; Mike Koehler,
What
If?,
CORP.
COMPLIANCE
INSIGHTS
(Nov.
27,
2012),
http://174.120.83.250/~killer1/cci/what-if (questioning what would happen if
the enforcement agencies issued guidance after the 1988 or 1998 amendments
or after a 2010 OECD report recommending guidance).
85. Mike Koehler, Guidance Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Nov. 16,
2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/guidance-roundup
(collecting
commentary from law firms, individuals, and civil society organizations
relating to the new guidance, most of whom conclude that “the guidance offers
little in terms of actual new substance”).
86. See Mike Koehler, Do Lanny Breuer and Robert Khuzami Actually
Read FCPA Enforcement Actions?, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/do-lanny-breuer-and-robert-khuzami-actuallyread-fcpa-enforcement-actions (describing the discrepancy between the FPCA
guidance which proposes prosecution against “payments of real and
substantial value” and FCPA prosecutions which list minor violations “about a
bottle of wine . . . a camera, kitchen appliances and business suits” as
violations substantial enough to sustain an enforcement action); Cf. Story of
the FCPA, supra note 16, at 1003–13 (describing the FCPA as a “limited
statute” that captures a narrow range of possible bribery payments, based on
the recipient and business purpose of the payment).
87. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15 at 118–119 n.97–102 (referring to
DOJ and SEC settlements to support legal claims).
88. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 7–8 (addressing the OECD
Convention and its enforcement, but not expanding upon specific goals or
procedures of the DOJ or SEC in promoting foreign enforcement).
89. The Sherman Act, an anti-trust statute, is enforced against foreign
firms based on specific judicially created tests that have been incorporated
into DOJ guidelines. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations §3.1 (1995), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm.
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Through these new guidelines, DOJ and SEC show a
willingness to respond to businesses’ concerns, but the vague
information included does not assist in predicting enforcement
patterns. The guidance lists several examples of potential
FCPA activity that the DOJ and SEC have declined to pursue,
but the examples do not address questions American
corporations are concerned with.90
FCPA guidance also includes a lay person’s guide, 91
responses to requests for an opinion from the DOJ, 92 and a
listing of previous enforcement actions.93 Investigations might
not be publicly disclosed, making it harder for companies to
rely on other corporations’ experiences for reference or
deterrence purposes.94 Policies regarding corporate criminal
prosecution lay out factors that will be taken into account,95 but
the DOJ has not provided any specifics on what companies can
expect with regard to FCPA enforcement. Criminal sentencing
guidelines may help companies determine if their conduct will
be eligible for lesser sanctions, but these guidelines do not
90. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15. But see Mike Koehler, The Guidance
and
Declinations,
FCPA
PROFESSOR
BLOG
(Nov.
27,
2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-guidance-and-declinations (noting that these
are not the first declination decisions announced by the agencies, and that the
declination decisions do not clarify the factors at play in a decision to
prosecute).
91. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions: Lay Person
Guide, DEP’T. OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/laypersons-guide.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
92. These requests for an opinion are limited to factual situations, not
hypotheticals, and may be used in future investigations by the DOJ. See FCPA
OPINIONS, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited Oct.
8, 2012); Garrett, supra note 51, at 1835–36 (describing increased use of
opinion process as enforcement has increased).
93. DOJ
FCPA
AND
RELATED
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/2012.html (last visited Oct.
27,
2012);
SEC
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
94. See Matthews, supra note 77, at 410–12 (1998) (questioning when
SEC investigations of privately held companies must be publicized if at all);
Mike Koehler, Secret FCPA Investigations, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Jan. 3,
2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/secret-fcpa-enforcement
(noting
inconsistencies in the newly issued FCPA guidance about if individual FCPA
non-prosecution agreements are made public).
95. Memorandum from Mark Filip, Depty Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys, regarding
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, 3–4 (Aug. 28,
2008),
http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf
(setting out nine factors to be used in determining whether to charge a
corporation in addition to individual prosecution factors).
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apply to civil sanctions and are not specific to the FCPA.96
Average DOJ criminal fines in enforcement actions have been
25-28% below the minimum guidelines, undermining the utility
of the guidelines as predictors of liability.97
The combination of aggressive international and foreign
enforcement, broad prosecutorial discretion, and unhelpful
prosecutorial guidelines has led to significant confusion about
the parameters of the FCPA and its enforcement.98 Because
FCPA cases are enforced extraterritorially, this uncertainty
regarding compliance also extends to international companies
in the United States and in foreign countries. Some
corporations respond with very conservative compliance
policies.99 Others are advised against self-reporting, even when
internal compliance issues arise.100 There are no bright lines to
the law, and therefore no one understands the limits or
expectations.
In other corporate legal contexts, regulations and
guidelines give corporations guidance in order to increase
consistent compliance.101 Guidance regarding extraterritorial
jurisdiction has been helpful in antitrust enforcement to clarify
96. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 77, at §8C2.5.
97. See discussion infra, note 78, and accompanying text; Mike Kohler,
DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA – Year In Review, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Jan.
9, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-year-inreview-3.
98. See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO . J. INT’L
L. 907, 910 (2010) (explaining the “opaque nature of FCPA enforcement”);
2010 Hearing, supra note 33, at 6–7 (“[O]ne of the basic principles of due
process is that people in companies have to be able to know what the law is in
order to comply with it . . . they do not always know what behavior will trigger
an enforcement action.”).
99. For example, Apple’s compliance policies are robust and closely
tailored to OECD definitions, and Apple was not named in an FCPA
enforcement action during Steve Jobs’ life. Compare Apple Business Conduct
Policy (July 2012), http://investor.apple.com/governance.cfm with OECD
Convention, supra note 27, art. 1.4(a).
100. See Former Federal Prosecutors Pen New Treatise on the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, METROPOLITIAN CORP. COUNS. (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/21790/former-federal-prosecutorspen-new-treatise-foreign-corrupt-practices-act (quoting attorneys who advise
some clients to “fix compliance problems . . . without the assistance of the U.S.
government” through nondisclosure of those compliance problems).
101. See James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for
Change in Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. LAW.
1233, 1235 (2007) (arguing that effective deterrence results from regulatory
certainty and shared knowledge of correct compliance, using the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 as an example).
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the reach of prosecutors and avoid international relations
issues.102
II. PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL FACTORS IN
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
A. LEGISLATIVE INTENT ON INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF
THE FCPA AND PROSECUTORS’ R ESPONSIBILITY TO A CT
WITHIN THAT INTENT.
Prosecutors should consider the drafters’ legislative intent
in the original act, as well as drafters’ intent in the
amendments touching on international issues with prosecution.
The drafters’ intent should influence the application of each
international factor where policy arguments can be made for
greater prosecution or greater discretion.
The FCPA has extraterritorial application and deals
exclusively with behaviors that involve at least one foreign
country. At its passage in 1977, and its subsequent
amendments in 1988 and 1998, foreign policy and international
considerations were important. Commentary focusing on
increased costs to American businesses is shortsighted in the
light of increased extraterritorial enforcement. Each
amendment stemmed from calls for international cooperation
to solve the global problem of corruption, and each amendment
was a step closer to a solution at the international level.103
1. DOJ and SEC Guidelines and Their Potential Effects
on Prosecutors’ Treatment of Legislative Intent
Prosecutorial guidance is needed to ensure consistent
application of the law. The use of non-prosecution and deferred
prosecution agreements circumvents the courts in the vast
majority of cases.104 The worries about prosecutorial abuse are
based on prosecutors’ frequent use of these agreements, and the
102. See Sarah A. Solow, Prosecuting Terrorists as Criminals and the
Limits of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1483, 1537–49
(2011) (comparing extraterritoriality due process tests in anti-trust and
securities statutes to determine a jurisdictional test for terrorists); Harvard
Law Review Association, Comity and Extraterritoriality in Antitrust
Enforcement, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1269 (2011) (exploring the way comity has
recently limited civil antitrust jurisdiction); Salil K. Mehra, Extraterritorial
Antitrust Enforcement and the Myth of International Consensus, 10 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 191, 211–16 (1999) (giving an overview of the international
antitrust controversy around the Boeing merger).
103. See discussion supra notes 16–33, and accompanying text.
104. See discussion supra notes 74–81, and accompanying text.
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risk that innocent companies “who fear the potential
aftershocks of the filing of criminal charges” will choose not to
defend themselves and “risk[ ] the farm” in favor of reaching an
agreement and being subjected to fines.105 Although some say
that “the DOJ has done a commendable job of policing itself,” 106
guidance about extraterritorial reach will avoid confusion on
the part of foreign corporations regarding the reach of
liability.107
Guidance through other means will not come quickly and
may not be effective. In this political climate, legislative action
is far from certain.108 Even if there is legislative action, the
culture of enforcement of the FCPA, which includes broad
prosecutorial discretion with little judicial or executive check,
will likely remain the same.
Judicial checks are infrequent, and so far have been
relatively unsuccessful.109 Current prosecution is inconsistent,
and extraterritorial enforcement is especially unpredictable.110
Prosecutorial guidelines that adhere to the legislative intent of
the current law are needed to clarify prosecutorial priorities,
ensure consistent application of the law, and assist
corporations in determining what correct compliance looks like
on an international scale.111
105. See Thomas, supra note 73, at 463–64 (giving an overview of the
arguments that prosecutors are abusing the system in the context of FCPA
enforcement actions).
106. See id. at 465.
107. Arguments about the DOJ abuse of discretion also rely on judicial
checks, which have not yet materialized and are unlikely to become a larger
player due to the structure and incentives around non and deferred
prosecution agreements. See id. at 465–66 (relying on individual criminal
prosecutions for the development of case law, but ignoring the lack of
development of civil case law).
108. Proposed laws have not gotten a lot of traction in the current
legislative climate. See Overseas Contractor Reform Act, H.R. 3588, 116th
Cong. (2011); Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 3531,
116th Cong. (2011).
109. See Big, Bold and Bizarre, supra note 39, at 119–23 (giving the
example of U.S. v. Kay to indicate a judicial limitation of the “obtain or retain
business” element, and showing that recent FCPA enforcement actions ignore
the limitation successfully, garnering settlements even though there are
questions of if conduct even violated the FCPA are warranted).
110. See discussion supra notes 50–52, and accompanying text.
Extraterritorial enforcement actions have increased in number and fines
against foreign corporations are higher than fines against American
corporations. This makes the uncertainty that stems from FCPA prosecutorial
discretion and enforcement more important on the international playing field.
111. See Doty, supra note 101, at 1235.
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Although the newly issued guidelines did not take these
factors into account, any additions to the guidelines should
carefully consider these issues. There are two main reasons
why the DOJ and SEC can and should elucidate extraterritorial
enforcement expectations. First, clarifying extraterritorial
enforcement discretion will not overreach into the legislative
arena. Even though the FCPA was drafted with extensive
extraterritorial jurisdiction, clarifying the reach prosecutors
should use does not infringe on the legislature’s definitions
within the act. Second, there are good policy reasons to clarify
extraterritorial reach. These policy reasons, such as foreign
policy, comity, promotion of international cooperation, and
protection of American foreign investments, are reflected in the
factors proposed below.
Generally, new guidelines should clarify prosecutorial
factors while leaving the intent of the legislature alone to
comply with balance of power concerns. New guidelines should
not attempt to predict what future congressional intent will be
by redefining terms or adding defenses to the FCPA, as many
legislative proposals suggest.112 Instead, guidelines should
focus on areas of traditional prosecutorial discretion. In the
case of the FCPA, the guidelines would be most effective if they
focused mainly on defining when prosecutors should bring an
extraterritorial case. The guidelines should start by taking the
relevant international factors into account, with prosecutors
keeping in mind that their client is “a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.”113
2. FCPA Costs to U.S. Businesses and the Effects of
Additional Extraterritorial Enforcement
Although some argue that FCPA enforcement increases
costs for U.S. businesses, these arguments carry less weight as
extraterritorial enforcement becomes more active. Legislative
history from 1977 that focused on increased costs to American
112. See Michael Volkov, Predictions for DOJ’s Upcoming FCPA Guidance,
LECLAIRRYAN
(Sept.
20,
2012)
http://www.leclairryan.com/pubs/xprPubDetail.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&pub=78
7 (suggesting the new guidelines may relax successor liability and may further
define “foreign official”).
113. Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added).
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businesses was premised on the assumption that the Act would
not have aggressive extraterritorial enforcement.114 The
concern about costs to U.S. businesses was a larger focus
during the 1998 amendment, but enforcement was still
concentrated domestically.115 During the 2010 legislative
hearing, questions of cost were rebutted with increased
enforcement against foreign companies.116
As the international enforcement becomes greater, the
argument that enforcement puts U.S. companies at a cost
disadvantage loses weight. In addition, concerns about cost are
rebutted with compelling arguments that companies who
actually do participate in bribery deserve the high costs of
enforcement and compliance.117 These arguments apply equally
to foreign and U.S. companies, since the FCPA was put into
place to ratify the OECD Convention, which combats an
international problem.118 If cost is a problem in need of reform,
legislative proposals can and do suggest appropriate
amendments.119 Because the increase in extraterritorial
enforcement spreads the cost of FCPA prosecutions across
countries, the arguments that there is a cost disadvantage to
U.S. companies will become less compelling as extraterritorial
enforcement increases.
B.
INTERNATIONAL
FACTORS
SHOULD
INFLUENCE
DISCRETION
1. Foreign Policy & Comity
Early FCPA cases and scholars have advocated for the
inclusion of foreign policy concerns when making prosecutorial
decisions.120 In the Act’s early days, FCPA investigations and
114. See discussion, supra notes 18–19, 26, 28–31, and accompanying text.
115. See discussion, supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
116. See 2010 Hearing, supra note 33, at 9–10 (answering the question “[I]s
this simply putting U.S.-headquartered companies at a disadvantage . . . ?”
with “. . . I will say that we are clearly prosecuting foreign companies . . . there
is an increased awareness in places like China and Russia.”).
117. See id. at 2 (“Nobody likes to pay fines, but it does not amount to a
whole lot in the context of what is going on here.”).
118. See discussion supra notes 27–31, and accompanying text.
119. See Weinograd, supra note 10, at 517–19, 526–29 (giving an overview
of the vague grease payment exception and asserting that costs on American
companies demand reform).
120. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1983 (“Courts and commentators alike
have noted that FCPA investigations and prosecutions can implicate issues of
foreign policy.”); Id. at 1983 n.42 (citing Clayo Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 408–09 (9th Cir. 1983)) (“Any prosecution
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enforcement actions were restrained by foreign policy
concerns.121 Empirical evidence now indicates that FCPA
prosecutors do not take foreign policy goals into account when
choosing how to proceed.122 Foreign policy and comity goals
would likely interfere with the consistent application of the
FCPA by introducing the softer variable of diplomacy. Even so,
enforcement agencies have taken these goals into account
successfully in other contexts, and there are important policy
reasons to consider the foreign policy ramifications of a
particular FCPA prosecution.
FCPA investigations focus on the supply side of the
corruption equation by punishing bribers instead of those who
have been bribed.123 The FCPA specifically prohibits targeting
the foreign sovereign in the action.124 In spite of this restriction,
these investigations still have the potential to be embarrassing
and destabilizing to the foreign governments taking bribes. 125
under the [FCPA] entails risks to our relations with the foreign governments
involved.”); Gillespie, supra note 70, at 9–11; Niles, supra note 74, at 359
(noting that prosecution implies a “decision that the interest against allowing
the United States parties to bribe a foreign government’s officials outweighs
the interest against possibly offending that government”).
121. See discussion supra note 70, and accompanying text; Gillespie, supra
note 70, at 10–11 (“An informal procedure was established between the Justice
and State departments to deal with questions of foreign- policy consequences
of FCPA investigations.”); Mclean, supra note 68, at 1983 n.42 (citing Clayo
Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 408–09 (9th Cir.
1983) (“The Justice Department and SEC share enforcement responsibilities
under the FCPA. They coordinate enforcement of the Act with the State
Department, recognizing the potential foreign policy problems of these
actions.”).
122. Mclean, supra note 68, at 2003 (“[M]ost proxies for foreign policy
considerations do not appear to be significantly associated with cross-national
variation in FCPA enforcement levels once other relevant factors are
controlled for.”).
123. See Newman, supra note 63 (criticizing the OECD and FCPA for
extending penalties only to suppliers of bribes, and not to foreign officials
demanding them).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(A) (2006).
125. See Spahn, supra note 49, at 178 (“[T]he interests of the foreign
sovereign are very much in play, even though the foreign sovereign . . . can
never personally become a defendant or target of an FCPA criminal
investigation.”); Mclean, supra note 68, at 1983 n.41 (referring to the Arab
Spring as an example of “official corruption in galvanizing antigovernment
protest”). But see Mike Koehler, Shades of Gray, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 4,
2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/shades-of-gray (highlighting a transcript
in which a judge disagreed with the argument that the reputation of Thailand
was hurt by alleged corruption, because the corruption may have stemmed
from conduct by the U.S. citizen-bribers instead of the Thai foreign officialbribees, therefore sullying the reputation of the United States and not
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The embarrassment may stem from the nationality of the
company being investigated, from the nationality of the officials
allegedly taking corrupt payments, or both.126
This
embarrassment could create friction between countries.
Guidelines could be based upon antitrust guidelines, which
focus on jurisdictional and proximate cause issues.127 This focus
is valuable because it will also target the most harmful conduct
to the U.S.128 Because the FCPA’s extraterritorial enforcement
is clearly intended by Congress, these guidelines should include
a balance between the intended enforcement process and the
foreign policy or comity concerns. Even if comity is used as a
restraint on civil cases, enforcement may still continue to rise
through civil crackdown on U.S. and foreign corporations who
fulfill jurisdictional and comity concerns, as well as through
criminal enforcement.129
Comity and due process are used to enforce extraterritorial
limitations when prosecuting under anti-trust statutes.130
Extraterritorial enforcement has increased in the same ways
under these statutes and “[t]he rise in FCPA prosecutions bears
a family resemblance to trends in the antitrust . . . area.”131
These statutes have developed extraterritorial guidelines
through judicial review and legislation.132 Civil antitrust
enforcement is limited by comity to foreign conduct with links
Thailand).
126. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1833–34 (suggesting the difference
between the two might be small, since bribes may be paid “in a foreign country
and often by foreign employees of a foreign subsidiary” of a U.S. corporation).
127. See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations,
supra note 89, at § 3.2.
128. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1843 (“[P]rosecutors have strong
incentives to target foreign conduct that significantly affects the United
States.”).
129. The use of comity has decreased civil cases in the antitrust area, but
criminal enforcement continues to rise even with guidelines regarding
defendant’s intended effects on the U.S. market. See discussion supra note 89,
and accompanying text; Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 102.
130. See Solow, supra note 102, at 1537–49 (2011) (comparing
extraterritoriality due process tests in anti-trust and securities statutes to
determine a prosecutorial jurisdiction test for terrorists); Harvard Law Review
Association, supra note 102 (exploring the way comity has recently limited
civil antitrust jurisdiction).
131. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1837.
The antitrust area also
experienced an increase in extraterritorial enforcement. Id. at 1819–25
(describing the increase).
132. See id. at 1820. This judicial review is unlikely to be replicated in the
FCPA case. See discussion supra, notes 74–89, and accompanying text.

WILLBORN Note 5.1.13

5/21/2013 12:01 AM

2013] CALL FOR FCPA PROSECUTORIAL FACTORS

445

to significant domestic effects,133 and securities cases are
limited by 5th amendment due process concerns to defendants
causing “reasonably foreseeable” harm to U.S. securities
markets.134 These limits on extraterritoriality are still
contentious in antitrust, but have thus far avoided repetition of
international diplomacy issues.135
The FCPA is more clearly intended to have extraterritorial
application than the Sherman Act.136 However, issues of
jurisdiction have already posed problems for the FCPA, and an
explanation would ensure that enforcement agencies do not
overstep while clarifying extraterritorial reach for other
countries.137 Even if prosecutors have good reasons to bring
more actions on foreign corporations, or to impose higher fines
on them, the trend of increased extraterritorial enforcement
may raise questions internationally when comity concerns
would advise discretion.138 Prosecutors should learn from the
133. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164
(2004) (holding that comity requires the jurisdiction of ambiguous statutes be
construed “to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of
other nations”). This effectively limited civil suits to proximate cause. See
Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 102, at 1273–74.
134. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 102, at 1544–45 (citing
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972)) (“[I]f Congress ha[d] expressly prescribed a rule with respect to conduct
outside the United States, even one going beyond the scope recognized by
foreign relations law, a United States court would be bound to follow the
Congressional direction unless this would violate the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.”).
135. Prior to comity restraints, international antitrust enforcement led to a
diplomatic issue between Europe and the United States when the FTC
approved a Boeing merger which was contested by Europe. See Harvard Law
Review Association, supra note 102, at 1271; Mehra, supra note 102 (giving a
thorough overview of the antitrust controversy and pointing out that although
this dispute involved Europe’s competing corporation Airbus, there are many
comity related reasons that an international incident could develop).
136. Unlike the FCPA, the antitrust statute was not originally intended to
have extraterritorial application, but its foreign enforcement has evolved over
the last seven decades. See Solow, supra note 102.
137. See Mike Koehler, Strange Things Happen in Threes – Another
Challenge in a SEC FCPA Enforcement Action Filed, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct.
22, 2012, 7:02 AM) (citing Motion to Dismiss, U.S. S.E.C. v. Sharef, No. 11 Civ.
9073
(2nd
Cir.
filed
Oct.
12,
2012),
available
at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/110723792/U-S-v-Herbert-Steffen-Steffen-Motionto-Dismiss),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/strange-things-happen-in-threesanother-challenge-in-a-sec-fcpa-enforcement-action (giving an overview of
three challenges to SEC FCPA enforcement actions and quoting from one
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to file within the
statute of limitations).
138. Prosecutors may have reasons for a larger number of actions,
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antitrust example and avoid the perception that U.S. agencies
are attempting to artificially support U.S. businesses under the
guise of an international solution.
In the potential News Corp case, comity would reason
against prosecution out of respect for the U.K.’s Bribery Act,
without regard to whether bribery has happened in the United
States. According to the terms of the FCPA, there is no
question as to U.S. jurisdiction. However, if the only discernible
bribery happened in the U.K., the United States should not
intervene with FCPA prosecution because the U.K.’s law is
similar enough to the FCPA in severity to ensure precise
prosecution of wrongdoers,139 and comity dictates that the
United States should allow a country to handle its own bribery
issues. If there is discernible bribery in the United States, the
argument for use of the FCPA is no stronger. The United States
would not be able to go after News Corp. for bribery of U.S.
officials within the U.S., since the FCPA only prohibits bribery
of foreign officials.140 There may be other reasons to prosecute
News Corp. in the United States, but the FCPA is not the
appropriate tool to use in those prosecutions.141
2. International Cooperation Agreements
Increased international cooperation and reliance on
treaties could influence prosecutorial discretion so that FCPA
allegations are pursued less frequently.142 Currently,
cooperation is taken into account to the extent that it makes
information-gathering and therefore enforcement easier.143 It is
including (1) a focus on more serious bribery on the part of foreign companies,
(2) protection of U.S. companies from unfair competition, (3) deterrence of
undetectable corruption by foreign companies by setting an example using
detectable corruption, (4) a focus on the most problematic foreign companies,
and a series of other reasons. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1812–13.
139. See U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 62.
140. Id.
141. The U.K. tabloid Daily Mirror has suggested that targets of phone
tapping might have included 9/11 victims and their family members. See
Pompeo, supra note 14. Although there is almost no evidence to indicate that
is the case, it would give the United States an uncontested jurisdictional hook
to sue. Id. (“[T]he paper’s sourcing was rail-thin . . . it hasn’t gained much
credence. . . . Credible or not, the D.O.J. and Federal Bureau of Investigation
have been looking into the claims.”).
142. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1986–88; see also Garret, supra note 51,
at 1834–43.
143. See Choi & Davis, supra note 68, at 5 (testing theories of enforcement
including international coordination, and finding disproportionally greater
sanctions when a corporation’s home country has a cooperation agreement
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also the only international factor that was mentioned in the
newly issued FCPA guidance, indicating that prosecutors are
taking some international factors into account already.144
International cooperation could dovetail nicely with comity
concerns to limit prosecution when the U.S. is considering
prosecution of the same matters at the same time as other
countries.145 Under this logic, the U.S. would not have to
abandon prosecution completely, but might impose lower
sanctions based on knowledge that another prosecution is
ongoing.146 On the other hand, the increased use of mutual
legal assistance treaties has made FCPA prosecutions easier,
and the DOJ has increasingly relied upon them, increasing
foreign enforcement actions.147
These treaties also ensure that the U.S. is not the sole
enforcer of anti-bribery actions. While some U.S. requests for
help investigating FCPA violations as agreed by the treaties
have been denied, the “vast majority” of requests for assistance
have been granted.148 The treaties have opened doors to
cooperation between countries to prosecute together.149
The shared information each country adds to the
prosecution decreases enforcement costs for all countries, and
with the United States). But see Mclean, supra note 68, at 2003 (“Although the
presence of a mutual legal assistance treaty with a given country was not a
significant predictor of FCPA enforcement levels, the presence of regulatory
and enforcement cooperation with the SEC was a significant determinant of
FCPA enforcement.”). Choi and Davis criticize Mclean’s analysis, finding that
“it does not take into account the defendant’s home countries.” Choi & Davis,
supra note 68, at 14.
144. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 7–8, 63.
145. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1988 (speculating that “perhaps when
the United States has a strong enforcement relationship with the host
country, U.S. authorities are more willing to defer to foreign prosecutors in the
interests of international comity”).
146. See Choi & Davis, supra note 68, at 10.
147. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1987 (citing F Joseph Warin, John W.F.
Chesley & Patrick F. Speice, Jr. Nine Lessons of 2009: The Year-in-Review of
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 38 SEC. REG. L.J. 19, 45 (2010))
(“[I]n 2009, a senior official noted ‘at least twenty-five cooperation requests to
foreign governments pursuant to mutual legal assistance treaties over the
past twelve months.’”).
148. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1987–88 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ,
RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES: QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3 OECD
WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY § 10.2 (2010)) ([T]he DOJ “has experienced the
gamut of cooperation – from full scale sharing of domestic investigative files
on short notice to outright non-compliance.’”).
149. See George & Lacey, supra note 59 (examining concurrent
investigations by many nations into Halliburton’s alleged misconduct).
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has made treaties popular enforcement tools. International
cooperation has the potential to ease prosecution, and allow
prosecutors to bring more actions with the same resources. The
effect of international cooperation on a particular FCPA action
depends on the context of the action, but often results in
concurrent prosecutions.
The Siemens prosecution would not have begun without
international cooperation. The case began when a bank in
Lichtenstein noticed unusual transactions and informed
Siemens as well as bank regulators in Germany and
Switzerland.150 The U.S. began to investigate only after
German police arrested Siemens’ officers two years later. 151
Because of the mutual legal assistance provisions in the OECD
Convention, the SEC and DOJ were able to work closely with
the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office and induce Siemens to
plead guilty.152 Under the plea agreement, Seimens paid fines
of $450 million to the DOJ, $350 million to the SEC, and $800
million to the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office.153 Siemens
also avoided a U.S. judgment under the sentencing guidelines
of $1.35 to $2.7 billion, more than twice the $800 million it paid
to U.S. agencies.154
In other cases, international cooperation ensured a case’s
success. In the Halliburton case, French officials began an
investigation of illicit payments to Nigerian officials by a joint
venture that included a Halliburton subsidiary.155 When they
realized that an American corporation was involved, they
provided information to the U.S. under their OECD convention
mutual legal assistance duties.156 The investigation, which
began in France in 2002,157 concluded in the United States in
2009 with a DOJ guilty plea and a criminal fine of $402
million158 and an SEC settlement of an additional $177
150. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1785.
151. See generally id.
152. Id. at 1785–86.
153. Id. at 1786 (citing Plea Agreement, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, No. CR-8-367 (Dec. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/siemens.pdf).
154. Id. at 1786.
155. See George & Lacey, supra note 59, at 504–505.
156. Id. This was roughly the same time that France adopted the OECD
Convention. Id. at 507–08.
157. Id. at 507.
158. Press Release, Department of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC
Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million
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million.159 The press releases from both the SEC and DOJ
acknowledged the role that international cooperation played in
the resolution of the action.160
However, the interest in comity may be limited by other
factors. For example, some countries are not willing to enforce
anti-bribery laws aggressively. Conflicts in law or policy
decisions may induce the United States to prosecute a
particular company if it believes another country is not
pursuing the case appropriately.161 For example, in 2007,
allegations emerged that a British company, BAE, bribed Saudi
officials with hundreds of millions of dollars.162 The British
investigation was dropped because the investigation “would
have been devastating for [the British] relationship with an
important country with whom [the British] cooperate closely on
terrorism, on security, on the Middle East Peace process.” 163
The U.S. pursued its own action under the FCPA and
eventually obtained a guilty plea from the U.S. subsidiary of
BAE.164 Since the BAE action, the U.K.’s new Bribery Act has
been implemented, bringing British bribery law much closer to
the FCPA.165 U.S. enforcement agencies may still choose to
bring an action under the FCPA, but may decide not to do so if
they are confident that the U.K. will aggressively implement
the new Bribery Act.

Criminal Fine, (Feb. 11, 2009) [hereinafter DOJ Halliburton Press Release],
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-crm-112.html.
159. Press Release, Securities and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges KBR and
Halliburton for FCPA Violations, (Feb. 11, 2009) [hereinafter SEC Halliburton
Press Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm.
160. See DOJ Halliburton Press Release, supra note 158 (“Significant
assistance was provided by . . . authorities in France, Italy, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom.”); SEC Halliburton Press Release, supra note 159 (“This
case demonstrates the close and cooperative working relationships that have
developed in FCPA investigations among the SEC, the U.S. Department of
Justice, and foreign law enforcement agencies and securities regulators.”).
161. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1839–43 (laying out limits of
international cooperation).
162. See id. at 1840–42.
163. See id. at 1841 (“The Saudis apparently told the British that, should
the investigation continue, they would no longer cooperate with anti-terrorism
efforts and a sale of seventy-two Eurofighter jets would be jeopardized.”).
164. This guilty plea came in 2010, three years after the allegations
surfaced. It was also after British officials rejected a DOJ request for
assistance in violation of the mutual legal assistance treaty through the
OECD Convention. See id. at 1840–41.
165. See discussion supra, notes 62–65, and accompanying text.
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3. Corruption Indexes & Foreign Direct Investment
Corruption indexes may be an influential factor in a
prosecutor’s decision to pursue a particular case of bribery.166
These indexes, such as the one promulgated by Transparency
International, a non-governmental organization, measure the
amount of corruption in a particular country using a single
number indicator.167 The reliance on this simple indicator may
not be justified or effective given the complex enforcement
analysis needed in FCPA actions. The corruption index on
which prosecutors are relying may be from the country in
which a company is headquartered or may be the corruption
index of the country in which the bribery allegedly took place. A
prosecution determination may be based on a measure of
corruption in those countries. In spite of the existence of these
indexes, the decision to prosecute should be based first on
comity and foreign policy interests. When evaluating comity
interests, a prosecutor may use more discretion when a
company is headquartered in a country that enforces robust
anti-bribery laws and a company that is headquartered in a
country with lax enforcement. The country’s level of
enforcement is not directly tied to the corruption index of the
country and comity serves as a more effective tool for
prosecutorial discretion.
In addition, these indexes may not accurately measure the
kind of corruption the FCPA prohibits. Corruption indexes can
oversimplify the corruption in a particular country, for instance
giving a high corruption rating to a particular country where
corruption consists of many payments for routine governmental
action, lawful under the FCPA.168 Prosecutors relying on
166. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1981–82 (explaining “the existence of
such a relationship is, in a sense, intuitive” as long as FCPA enforcement is
not highly selective geographically, since higher numbers of foreign officials
accepting bribes should lead to more instances of corruption, and therefore
higher levels of enforcement).
167. See Transparency International, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
(last
visited
Jan.
24,
2013),
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview.
168. Corruption can be distinguished into two categories: top-down
corruption, through which top officials extract rents from all levels of
government to line their own pockets in return for major government
contracts, and bottom-up corruption, through which officials at all levels
extract small rents from the populous in return for various routine activities.
These categories of corruption are not mutually exclusive, and some countries
have a combination of the two instead of leaning more one way or the other.
FCPA enforcement is meant to distinguish between the two, and punish only
the first, but most corruption indexes do not make that distinction. See, e.g.,
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corruption indexes will therefore over-prosecute in areas with
routine “grease” payments. Moreover, corruption indexes based
on perceptions may not indicate changes in actual corruption,
and may miss corruption that is not perceived.169 Some
corruption indexes suffer from both of these issues: they
conflate illegal with legal bribery, and rely on perceptions
instead of individual experience.170
The U.S. has an interest in protecting investments abroad
from bribery and corruption. For that reason, prosecutors may
use the amount of U.S. money flowing into a country to
determine whether to prosecute.171 This reasoning could also be
used to prosecute corporations headquartered in one country
and bribing in another, potentially expanding extraterritorial
enforcement with regard to two foreign countries at the same
time.172 Protecting American money and investment abroad is
not in line with the original intent of the FCPA, which was
enacted to protect the reputation of American companies. The
new protections may be at odds with comity or foreign policy if
foreign countries see FCPA enforcement actions as an
intrusion. However, protecting foreign direct investment is in
line with the new legislative intent of 1998 to combat
corruption while ensuring that American businesses function
without competitive disadvantage.173 Importantly, prosecution
taking corruption indexes and each of the other international
id. at 4 (capturing corruption as a “single aggregate indicator” and defining
corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”).
169. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1982 n.38 (“[P]erceptions, after all,
might well have a tendency to persist over time.”).
170. Some corruption surveys do attempt to use individual experience to
gather data, but run into issues with defining the terms like “government
official” and ignore cultural perceptions of what a bribe is in the first place.
See id. at 1991–92 (using the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS)
question “During the past year has any government official, for instance a
customs officer, police officer, or inspector in your own country, asked you or
expected you to pay a bribe for his services?”).
171. Id. at 1979–81 (giving reasons why investment may induce greater or
lesser prosecution).
172. This line of reasoning may support prosecuting more US companies.
See Krever, supra note 45, at 92–93 (citing J.S. Hellman, et al., Are Foreign
Investors and Multinationals Engaging in Corrupt Practices in Transition
Economies? TRANSITION 4, 6 (World Bank, 2000) (“A higher percentage of US
firms pay public procurement kickbacks (over 40%) in the countries analyzed
than do firms based in France, Germany, and the U.K.”).
173. But see A Tale of Two Laws, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2011), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21529103 (arguing that current enforcement
of the FCPA in poor corruption-ridden countries deters American companies
from entering those markets in the first place).
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factors into account should be in line with legislative intent.
III. CONCLUSION
The nature of extraterritorial enforcement and its
increased use in the FCPA context naturally raises difficulties
regarding foreign policy, comity, and diplomacy that
prosecutors do not seem to take into consideration. Although
there are legislative proposals to clarify provisions of the FCPA,
prosecutorial guidance from the DOJ and SEC that takes
international factors into account is necessary, especially
prosecutors often work outside of executive or judicial checks.
Legislative intent regarding enforcement is already clear, but
the enforcement agencies must issue guidance concerning the
extraterritorial enforcement and international factors in order
to clarify prosecution.
Foreign policy and comity should restrict extraterritorial
prosecution to the extent that a foreign country is prosecuting
its own corruption, and to the extent that the bribery had little
direct or indirect effect on the United States. International
cooperation may enhance prosecutions to the extent that it
makes prosecution easier, but there may be limits to
international cooperation’s efficacy in prosecution, because of
possible conflicts between U.S. and foreign law and the limits of
comity. Corruption indexes and foreign direct investment may
indicate a geographic focus for prosecution, but corruption
indexes are unreliable measures of illegal bribery, and the use
of foreign direct investment is not supported by legislative
history. Prosecutors should limit their discretion by foreign
policy and comity concerns, while taking international
cooperation into account more as international motivation to
combat bribery increases.

